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Corporate governance practices and outcomes in social enterprises in 
the UK: a case study of South Yorkshire 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper explores the growth of social enterprise in the UK in the context 
of the renewed interest in the creative use of organisations with a social mission to 
complement public service delivery. Given the impact of globalisation and increased 
demands for effective social welfare interventions, this paper specifically focuses on 
the nature and type of social enterprise governance models and how they influence 
their outcomes. 
Design/methodology/approach- The study utilises an in-depth multiple case study 
approach. The data was collected from interviews of key informants and was 
recorded, transcribed and manually analysed inductively. 
Findings – The paper finds that the way in which the social enterprise governance 
structure is designed ultimately influences its outcomes. In particulate those with 
stewardship governance models tend to perform better than those with democratic 
models of governance. This leads to a conclusion that in the social context of the UK, 
social enterprise should aim for a paradigm shift in the design and selection of 
governance models. 
Research limitations/implications – Comparative regional experiences in other 
regions or social contexts could enrich our understanding of whether these results are 
applicable across the board. 
Practical implications – This article is of potential benefit to researchers and 
particularly those designing policies for the governance of social enterprise. 
Originality/value –The study employs innovative   analytical theoretical lenses not 
normally associated with the social economy to increase our understanding of the 
growth and evolution of social enterprise governance. 
 
 Keywords: social enterprise, corporate governance, globalisation, innovation, 
operational efficiency, theoretical application, sustainability 
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Introduction 
 
Social enterprise is an emerging concept that still suffers from largely unresolved 
conceptual and definitional issues (Martin and Thompson, 2010).  However, scholars 
generally agree that a social enterprise is a business that seeks to bring people and 
communities ‘together for economic development and social gain’ (Martin and 
Thompson, 2010:6). Historically, social enterprises have been governed through 
democratic models that emphasise the development of trust and solidarity among 
those involved and are not necessarily geared towards supporting commercial 
activities (Low, 2006; Child and Rodrigues, 2004). It is thus surprising that 
contemporary discourses in social enterprise governance suggest that some social 
enterprises are drifting towards for – profit governance models. Cornforth (2003), 
Mason et al (2006) and most recently Harradine and Greenhalgh (2012) argue that this 
development is a result of the changing economic climate as well as complexities and 
shortcomings associated with democratic governance models. The key question, 
though, remains whether the shift from democratic to other forms of governance 
models of social enterprise actually makes any difference with respect to success or 
failure of a social enterprise. This paper examines whether the corporate governance 
model adopted by an enterprise can influence its outcomes.   
Discussions in this paper start with scrutiny of corporate governance theory and how 
this can be applied to social enterprise, followed by a critical analysis of social 
enterprise governance, underpinned by Agency Theory (AT), Stewardship Theory 
(ST) and Resource Dependency theory (RDT).  The paper concludes by discussing the 
findings of an investigation on social enterprise undertaken in South Yorkshire region 
and their implications for policy formulation. 
Governance of social enterprises  
The governance of firms, and particularly the role of the board and its impact on 
performance, continues to attract the interest of researchers (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004; Herrala and Haapasalo, 2012). Monks and Minow (1995:1) describe corporate 
governance as ‘the relationship among various participants in determining the 
direction and performance of a corporation’. The board, according to Daily et al 
(2003), is the locus of the internal governance of a corporation and performs several 
key roles. These include performing various functions and making key decisions 
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regarding the direction and strategic focus of the organisation (Bridge et al, 2009, 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Zahra and Pearce (1989) summarise the functions or roles 
of the board as service, control and strategic. These are associated with the Agency, 
Stewardship and Resource Dependency theories. 
 Whilst corporate governance is not new in the commercial sector, it is increasingly 
coming under scrutiny in the social economy (Low, 2006). For example, researchers 
such as Abzug and Galaskiewicz (2001) and most recently Spear et al. (2009) have 
undertaken insightful empirical work on social enterprise governance. Traditionally, 
social enterprises have been governed through democratic models which have roots in 
the philanthropic organisations of the nineteenth century (Pearce, 2003; Chell, 2007). 
The boards of directors or trustees of these organisations are unpaid and usually 
voluntary in nature Paton (2003).  Spear et al,(2009) argue that, despite being 
voluntary, such boards of directors are pivotal to the success of social enterprise 
because they ensure accountability, legitimacy and transparency in the operations of 
such organisations. This paper now critically analyses the governance of social 
enterprise in the context of Agency Theory (AT), Resource Dependency Theory 
(RDT) and Stewardship Theory (ST) perspectives on of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance theories and application to social enterprise 
Agency	Theory	(AT)	and	Social	Enterprise	
Agency theory is considered as one of the dominant theoretical perspectives in the 
literature on corporate governance (Daily et al, 2003; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
The theory is underpinned by the ’model of man’ which assumes that shareholders 
will lose control as the firm grows and that managers will prioritise their own interests 
above those of the organisation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). The theory analyses the relationship between the principal (stockholder) and 
the agent, who is responsible for implementing the tasks delegated by the principal 
(Eisenhardt1989). 
 
In a commercial sense, a social enterprise has no shareholders or stockholders. Abzug 
and Galaskiewicz (2001) and Low and Chinnock (2008) argue that it is difficult to 
identify the principal and the agent. In addition, since the governance of social 
enterprise is underpinned by democratic and participatory principles, it is highly 
unlikely that senior managers of such enterprises would engage in self-serving 
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activities (Mason et al, 2006). Since social enterprises are traditionally driven by 
democratic models of governance, it is evident that this type of governance 
contradicts the AT approach, at the core of which is an independent board free from 
managerial influence (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Furthermore, McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) as well as Spear et al., (2009), note that a lack of clear separation of 
powers between the executive and operational staff in non-profits can create a 
minimalist board and negatively affect efficiency.  
Callen et al (2010) and Iecovich (2005) however stress that the AT approach is still 
relevant to social enterprise. The researchers cite specifically the role that the board 
plays in protecting the organisation’s assets and controlling the activities of managers 
to prevent misallocation of resources .This view is supported by Fama and Jensen 
(1983) who suggest that mechanisms to control assets and monitor activities and staff 
of non-profits are essential, since these organisations do not normally possess residual 
assets. 
Resource	Dependency	Theory	(RDT)	and	Social	Enterprise	
Whilst the AT theory focuses on the board’s monitoring and controlling role, the 
Resource Dependency (RD) theoretical approach explains how directors ensure that 
their organizations access the resources they need (Daily et al., 2003). This relatively 
underexplored approach focuses on the exchange relationship between the firm and its 
external environment (Davis and Cobb, 2009). Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) 
suggest that the Resource Dependency Theory approach has four benefits in that it 
focuses on network connections among directors, horizontal coordination, vertical 
coordination and expertise and reputation. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to these 
collectively as board capital, consisting of both human and relational capital necessary 
in assisting an organisation to mobilise key resources. 
Since raising capital is a chronic problem in the social economy, the RDT is thus 
relevant to social enterprise as they are keen to increase the flow of resources and 
expertise from external constituencies (Callen et al, 2010; O’Regan and Oster, 2005). 
Strategies include recruiting directors on the basis of their ability to positively 
influence the outside world to the advantage of their organisations (Callen et al., 
2010). The board therefore acts as a link to the external environment, which can 
facilitate access to resources.  
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Stewardship	Theory	(ST)	and	Social	Enterprise	
 
Stewardship Theory (ST) is a relatively new approach to corporate governance and is 
associated with the work of researchers such as Muth and Donaldson (1998), 
Donaldson and Davis (1991). Under the ST model, which is typical in for-profit 
organisations, the role of the board of directors is that of an adviser and strategy 
formulator (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  The role of the manager is that of a ‘steward’ 
rather than an individual seeking to maximise his/her own utility as agency theory 
assumes (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Jenkins et al, 2007). There is little literature, 
however, on stewardship theory in the non-profit sector. Scholars such as Pfeffer and 
Salancik, (1978), O’Regan and Oster (2005), Miller - Millensen (2003) and Iecovich 
(2005) and most recently Low (2006) have written extensively on the nature of non-
profit governance and how this affects their outcomes. This work clearly shows that 
some social enterprises are considering the stewardship governance model particularly 
due to the complexities of trading associated with democratic governance models. 
Van Slyke’s (2005) findings in his study on social enterprises involved in public 
sector contracting show that the stewardship model is becoming a viable alternative 
for social enterprises seeking to be competitive in a hostile economic environment.  
From the above discussion we can draw out three main issues that have a bearing on 
the central argument of this paper. Firstly effective governance is just as important in 
the social economy as it is in the commercial sector. The governance of social 
enterprises therefore has implications for how social enterprises operate and their 
outcomes (Tranquada and Pepin, 2006). Secondly, contemporary discourses however 
show that the democratic governance model of social enterprise itself is now being 
increasingly questioned, given the evolution of the concept and its market relations. 
For example, Etchart and Davis (2003) and Ridley-Duff (2007) are of the opinion that 
the democratic governance associated with volunteer-dominated boards is inconsistent 
with the operations of a modern business. This argument is supported by Dees (2001), 
who suggests that voluntary board members tend to have a more hands-on approach 
than those in for-profit organisations, making them difficult to manage.  
Thirdly, traditional governance theories can be applied to social enterprise. Although 
social enterprises have emerged in the context of political, economic and social 
change as discussed above, they are corporate bodies and therefore suitable for 
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analysis like commercial firms. The paper also argues that, despite being untested and 
new in the social economy, stewardship theory is a suitable lens that allows analysis 
of the governance of contemporary social enterprise. Although this theoretical 
approach, though, having foundations in neo-classical economic theory (which is also 
a source of criticism), its   use in this paper makes it possible to merge economic and 
social dimensions of contemporary social enterprises (Laville et al, 2004). Based on 
the literature review, we can see that the nature of social enterprise governance has a 
bearing on both their outputs and outcomes. 
Methods and Data Collection 
 
The research design employed in this paper was based on a mixed method approach 
involving the complementary use of quantitative and qualitative data collection 
methods. Data from a postal survey of 102 self-defined social enterprises was 
complemented by an in-depth qualitative analysis of four selected cases. Quantitative 
research was important in identifying numbers and patterns of organisations that 
described themselves as social enterprises in South Yorkshire, given the paucity of 
information to this effect. Postal questionnaires were preferred to face-to-face 
interview techniques due to the geographical focus of the work (Denscombe, 2003; 
Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). The researchers used their knowledge and contacts in 
key social enterprise support organisations across the region to obtain contact 
information. In addition to ascertaining the number of self-defined social enterprises 
in South Yorkshire, the questionnaire obtained data on some of the critical factors 
affecting their growth and sustainability  
 
The investigation used an in-depth multiple case study approach, utilising qualitative 
face to face interviews to complement the conclusions from the data collected through 
the questionnaire survey (Saunders et al, 2009). A semi-structured interview guide 
was used to collect relevant data from the selected cases. The key informants selected 
and interviewed were the founders of the social enterprises and senior managers. The 
case study analysis involved a comparative analysis of four (4) case studies, as shown 
below in Table 1. These cases were given fictitious names to anonymise them. Two 
had company limited by guarantee (CLG) legal structures (The Cafe and the 
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Community Champion) and the remaining two, (The Landscaper and The Trainer), 
had company limited by shares (CLS) legal structures. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
SPSS was used to analyse the quantitative data from questionnaire returns, given the 
empirical nature and size of the sample that had been obtained. The data collected 
from interviews of key informants was recorded, transcribed and manually analysed 
through an inductive process, which enabled the researcher to critically analyse each 
case study generate codes and manually identify the emerging themes (Bryman and 
Bell 2003; Yin 1993; Straus and Corbin, 2008). 
Discussion of results and key findings  
 
One of the key objectives of this paper is to gain insight into the nature of social 
enterprises’ governance and how this influences the way they operate.  Analysis of the 
composition of the board of directors and the functions of the boards of the cases 
under investigation painted an intriguing picture.  
Table 2 below shows a cross tabulation of description of the organisation and 
governance of social enterprises. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Board structure and composition of cases with democratic governance models 
Table 2 shows that the vast majority of these self-defined social enterprises are 
governed by volunteer boards of directors/trustees and paid staff. This dimension was 
supported by data from qualitative interviews. For example, the respondent from The 
Community champion said, ‘We are all volunteers; we don’t want to get anything out 
of this…I mean…financially. We are here to help the community’.   
These volunteers are therefore motivated by philanthropic rather than economic 
considerations in their involvement in the governance of these social enterprises. The 
respondent from The Cafe made this clear when he said, ‘we [the directors] could be 
doing other financially rewarding things in our life....we want to help the community 
and this is what brought us together’. 
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Board structure and composition of cases with stewardship governance models 
Table 2 interestingly shows that the number of social enterprises with paid boards of 
directors and staff account for a very small percentage of the sample (3%). These also 
have for profit governance models. In addition to typical for-profit shareholders, these 
enterprises have also co-opted owner managers on their boards. This dimension shows 
a distinct move from traditional forms of participative and democratic management 
principles as social entrepreneurs take the lead and provide hands-on management of 
the social enterprise (Low, 2006). This is a characteristic of the stewardship model of 
governance. This development is supported by results from the qualitative interviews 
of the respective cases. The respondent from the Trainer said, 
‘As the owner of the project idea, it’s important that I take a leading role ….it’s 
important that our governance structure allows me to do this’. 
On the other hand, a respondent from the Landscaper, whose board also includes a 
funder, remarked, ‘Of course having a funder on the board is a good thing...perhaps 
they will give us more money when they can see how well we are doing’.  
This dimension reveals the need for multi-stakeholder boards in social enterprises so 
as to adapt and widen sources of investments and expertise, a significant characteristic 
of the RDT approach.  
The paper analyses the governance and board functions of social enterprise by 
comparing those underpinned by using CLG legal structures with those underpinned 
by CLS legal structures. This is shown below is Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Board Functions of cases with democratic governance models 
It is clear from Table 3 above that cases with CLG legal status have boards that reflect 
democratic governance principles. The duties of these boards are largely fiduciary, i.e. 
holding the organisation and its assets in trust .Quantitative research shows that in 
addition to setting the strategic direction of the organisation and ratifying decisions, 
the boards of directors of these organisations also control and direct the organisations’ 
day to day activities. These activities, particularly monitoring and control of activities 
are consistent with the Agency theory. In this case the boards are agents of their 
stakeholders such as members of the community. This is supported by results from the 
qualitative interviews. For example, the respondent from The Community Champion 
remarked, ‘the board works closely with the manager and operational staff...we 
monitor everything because as I have said, our activities are funded and we have to 
be accountable to funders’.  
Regarding the function of its board, the respondent from The Cafe said, ‘Everything is 
done democratically, but it is our duty to ensure that the staff are doing their duties, 
because we are accountable to the community and funders’.  
These responses show that, although not usually possessing residual assets, social 
enterprises do need to protect the assets they have from abuse (Iecovich, 2005). The 
boards’ functions, however, appear to be incongruent with the democratic governance 
models associated with social enterprise.  
Board functions of cases with stewardship governance models 
Table 3 shows that the functions and roles of the board of directors of the enterprises 
with CLS legal status reveal a drift towards stewardship models of governance. 
Unlike those with democratic governance models, there is a clear attempt by the board 
to empower and provide autonomy for senior managers to work in the best interests of 
the organisation. This dimension is supported by case study interviews. The 
respondent from The Trainer said, ‘We have a good board... they let us do the work. 
We go to them for advice on issues affecting the organisation... the senior managers 
here ...we let them get on with it’.  
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The respondent from The Landscaper also said, ‘The board members are similar to 
what they would be in a private company….it’s a practical choice rather than a social 
choice... They [the board] are responsible for strategic issues including ...  help with 
key decisions’.  
In both cases the lead entrepreneurs perform the CEO role and are also central in the 
decision making process of the board, as they are part of it. They are mandated to 
make operational decisions and their expertise is recognised by their respective 
boards, a point made by a respondent from The Landscaper when he said: ‘I still make 
the day to day decisions and go to them [the board] for legal and financial advice’.  
This response highlights the role of the board as adviser and strategy formulator i.e. 
making key decisions and providing the necessary direction and strategic focus 
required for the organisation to achieve its objectives (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
The two CLS organisations also had mechanisms to co-opt individuals or funders onto 
their boards for the benefit of their organisations. This resonates with the resource 
dependency theory. The Trainer managed to attract three social enterprises onto its 
board, two of which actually bought dividend bearing shares valued at £2500 each. 
The respondent from this organisation said, ‘Yes, they [the social enterprises] also 
want to grow their capital...and it’s good for us that we can raise finance this way, 
without seeking a loan’. He explained further ‘They sit on the board and can vote’. 
Although the dividend rate of return of these investments (i.e. 6%), is quite low 
compared to commercial rates, this is a significant development in the social 
economy.  
Outcomes of social enterprise and governance 
Figure 1 below shows empirically derived information showing how type of 
governance model of social enterprises influences their outcomes.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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It is clear that for The Trainer, the need to access equity investments influenced the 
organisation to adopt a CLS legal structure. This in turn resulted in a  governance 
model characterised by elements of both stewardship and resource dependency 
approaches. This provides opportunities for the social enterprise to access a variety of 
commercial opportunities that can increase its turnover and cash flows into the 
organisation and therefore support its social ethos. The respondent from the Trainer 
supported this positive by saying: 
 ‘One of our key objectives is to attract investments into our organisation…we also 
need the right type of people on our board to allow this’  
This position was also shared by the respondent from the Landscaper who said, 
‘ We have been very careful about the type of governance we want. We need to attract 
the investments and people that can drive this organisation forward and leave us to 
do the work’.  
Such organisations therefore seek to be a sustainable entity with governance models 
that allow them to integrate the achievement of both financial and social goals in its 
operations.  
On the other hand, it can be seen that the governance models of  organisations with 
CLG legal structures (The Community Champion and The Café), are characterised by 
an aversion towards material infrastructure and a commitment to democracy and 
inclusiveness in the running of the organisation.. Their vulnerability to the vagaries of 
the market and their inability to pursue a wide range of commercial opportunities 
means that their potential to attain financial viability is limited, as shown in Figure 1. 
This is confirmed by the respondent from the Community champion who remarked, 
‘We value shared ownership because we exist for the community….we generates very 
little money on our own and that’s why we are struggling at the moment. 
Conclusion	
This paper highlights the nature and character of social enterprise governance and 
makes a significant contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon. This 
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contribution to knowledge also has policy implications, particularly at a time when 
social enterprises are facing viability constraints associated with their governance. 
This paper argues that democratic governance models of social enterprise are still 
relevant in the social economy as they conform to the philanthropic ideology 
underpinning the concept of social enterprise, with a clear desire to protect assets of 
the organisation on behalf of the community and an aversion to trading. However this 
also results in a multiplicity of functional problems and organisations with such 
models struggle to compete in the market for resources and expertise.  
The paper argues that the dissatisfaction with democratic governance models explains 
the increasing interest in the other governance models such as stewardship. Changes 
in the economic environment for social enterprise appear to have provided the 
impetus for this shift. For example, as more opportunities for social enterprises 
emerge, particularity in public service delivery, they are likely to engage more with 
external stakeholders including suppliers, investors and the community as supported 
by the work of Lewis et al (2004) as well as Hodgkin and Hughes (2012). This paper 
therefore argues that innovation in governance models has become an important pre-
requisite for success in competitive markets. In this instance, consideration of for-
profit stewardship models can open   up opportunities that traditional social economy 
organisations cannot exploit. Despite limitations associated with stewardship 
governance models, they empower individuals in their organisations to be more 
proactive and business-like. These developments signal a new trajectory that the 
social enterprise sector is exploring, even though the results of the study in this paper 
show that the number of social enterprises considering this option is negligible. 
It is important to note that the economic environment of non-profits is complex and 
heterogeneous compared to that of the commercial sector. The authors acknowledge 
the need for further research to explore the stewardship governance model for social 
enterprise as this is a dramatic shift from the ideology underpinning the concept. This 
obviously requires strong state support (Cornelius and Wallace, 2013; Hodgkin and 
Hughes, 2012). 
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Table 1: Cases under investigation        
Organisation Thematic Activity Type of legal structure 
The Trainer Provision of basic 
education and training 
Share capital (CLS) 
The Landscaper Environmental 
management and 
consultancy   
Share capital (CLS) 
The Cafe Environmental 
preservation and 
renewable energy 
Limited by Guarantee 
(CLG) 
The Community 
Champion 
Provision of non-
accredited skills training 
Limited by Guarantee 
(CLG) 
Source: survey data 
 
Table 2: Cross tabulation of description of the organisation and governance of 
social enterprise 
Description 
of 
organisations 
Governance of social enterprise 
 Volunteer 
board and 
staff 
Paid 
board of 
directors 
and staff 
Manager/main 
entrepreneur 
Volunteer 
board and 
paid staff 
Volunteer 
board and 
part-time 
paid staff 
Managed 
by host 
organisation 
Total 
Social 
enterprise 
5 2 9 41 1 - 58 
Co-op 1 - - 1 - - 2 
Community 
organisation 
4 1 4 23 2 - 34 
Combination 
of all three 
- - 1 - - - 1 
Registered 
charity 
- - - 2 - - 2 
Development 
trust 
- - - 2 - - 2 
Social firm - - - 1 - - 1 
Not for profit - - - 1 - - 1 
Self 
financing 
- - - - - - 1 
Total 10 3 14 71 3 1 102 
Source: survey data 
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Table 3: Cross tabulation of type of legal structure and board functions 
 
Type of 
legal 
structure 
Setting 
strategic 
direction
Ratifying 
decisions 
Monitoring 
and control 
Holding 
assets 
in trust 
Empowering 
CEOs 
Mobilising 
resources 
total 
Company 
limited 
by 
guarantee 
10 7 36 26 - - 79 
Company 
limited 
by shares 
4 - - - 3 1 8 
Others - - 5 10 - - 15 
Total 14 7 41 36 3 1 102 
Source: survey data 
 
 
Figure 1: Type of governance structure and influence on social enterprise 
outcomes 
 
Ownership of business 
Access to equity investments 
Social objectives ,Availability of expert 
legal & business   
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